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Abstract 
This paper identifies the use of power-sharing dimensions in peace negotiations for the 
Angola civil war and their success or otherwise. It concludes that a series of dynamics 
were at play preventing successful power-sharing solutions and adds one factor to the 
current literature. In particular, the monolithic nature of each contending party made it 
practically impossible for the Mpla and Unita to cooperate under a shared structure. 
This is illustrated through a historical revision of the conflict's power-sharing 
provisions and characteristics of each party.        
 
Introduction
1
 
Power-sharing agreements have become a relevant topic in today's international affairs 
and a common component for negotiated solutions to conflicts. Of the 38 civil wars 
resolved via a process of negotiations between 1945 and 1998 (a sub-set of the overall 
universe, which also includes settlements imposed by conflict victors), only one 
agreement failed to have any form of power-sharing, the short lived 1989 Gbadolite 
Accord for Angola (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003).  
The civil war in Angola started in 1975 and ended in 2002. Throughout, a series of 
significant changes occurred to the conflict and several peace processes were executed. 
This paper both analyses whether power-sharing provisions were used and also 
identifies key constraints in the process leading to peace and democracy.  
We start with a review of the power-sharing concepts before then presenting a historical 
description of the conflict in Angola and of the agreements reached. There follows a 
description of the nature of each party (Mpla and Unita) throughout the conflict before 
proceeding with an identification of the main factors limiting power-sharing present in 
the conflict as identified in the literature. In the next section, the analysis proposes that 
an additional factor, the monolithic
2
 nature of each party, is necessary to fully explain 
the dynamics described. The paper finishes with a conclusion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The paper was prepared as part of the “Poverty and Peace in Portuguese Speaking African Countries” 
project funded by the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) of the Portuguese Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Higher Education -  research grant: PTDC/AFR/64207/2006. I would like to 
thank participants at the “Southern Africa in the Cold War era Working Seminar” organised by the 
Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) and the London School of Economics (LSE) Ideas 
at Fundação Luso Americana (FLAD) in Lisbon on 8 and 9 of May 2009 for their feedback and 
additionally to Inge Ruigrok and Gerhard Seibert for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Any remaining errors are my own.   
2 Monolithic, something which is single, massive and unchangeable (Oxford Dictionary, 1989).  
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Power-sharing, conflict resolution and democracy  
Generally speaking power-sharing agreements are political architectures aimed at 
guaranteeing potential warring factions a role in the country's government, through 
either securing one's inclusion or the competitor’s exclusion from specific areas, and 
hence decreasing the stakes of political contestation. 
Gates and Strom (2007) identify how the capacity of power-sharing agreements to 
promote peace depends on the relative military capacity of each side to the conflict as 
well as on the potential role of spoilers. The ideal environment for peace to be 
successfully achieved is when the sides are evenly balanced and the costs of war are 
relatively high. In their analysis, one of the greatest threats to peace are “spoilers” - 
leaders and parties that have the capacity and will to resort to violence and to subvert 
peace processes through the use of force.  
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) categorize power-sharing into four types depending if it 
intends to divide power along political, territorial, military or economic dimensions. 
They conclude that when resolving civil wars through negotiated processes the greater 
the number of power-sharing dimensions included, the greater the chances of an 
enduring peace.  
Binningsbo (2005) and Reynal-Querol (2002) have identified that the Lijphart model is, 
in general, suitable for post-conflict societies. Lijphart’s (1977) model on consociational 
democracy (in Gates & Strom (2007)) has four main components: a grand coalition, 
autonomy for each ethnic segment in all matters not of common concern, mutual veto 
rights and proportionality in political representation, civil service appointments and the 
allocation of public funds.   
But several shortcomings have been identified to power-sharing agreements. Besides 
the classical transaction costs, adverse selection and moral hazard (Gates & Strom, 
2007), Spears (2000) lists a series of challenges to power-sharing
3
, specifically that: it 
interferes with the option of total power offered by competitive elections; it is normally 
integrated by parties into a strategy to augment military and political power; it requires 
otherwise incompatible individuals and groups to co-operate; one of the groups is 
required to relinquish some power, either the stronger to level the power field 
(conceding more power than would be gained through electoral competition or military 
victory) or the weaker to become integrated in the political game (for instances 
releasing claims for regional autonomy through integration into the government); 
groups fear their power can be jeopardised in the future; and there are varying degrees 
of commitment to a strategy.  
As is presented in the next section almost all of these challenges were present in the 
Angola conflict at one stage or another of trying to reach a power-sharing solution able 
to bring about peace and democracy.  
 
The Angola conflict and power-sharing solutions 
The case of the Angola conflict is paramount to this field given it spans a long period of 
time where power-sharing was either not attempted or failed to be implemented both 
with limited and extended formulations. Only a military victory in 2002, together with 
negotiations and power-sharing provisions, would establish lasting peace in the country.  
                                                 
3 Additionally, Jarstad (2006) identifies that in war torn societies there can be long term negative 
implications of power-sharing deals for both peace and democracy. 
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The independence process was established by the Alvor accords signed in 15 January 
1975. The accords agreement committed the three liberation movements: the National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (Fnla); Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (Mpla); and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita)
4
 to 
form a transitional coalition government, a National Defence Commission which would 
integrate troops from each side and the development of a constitution to which elections 
were to follow in October 1975, with 11 November 1975 as the date for independence 
(George, 2005).   
Nevertheless during that year the transition process collapsed and on the day of 
independence a long civil war began opposing the three movements (while the Fnla 
would soon cease to represent a significant party to the conflict). On the one side, there 
was the Mpla supported mainly by Cuba and the Soviet Union and on the other side 
there was Unita supported mainly by the United States of America (USA) and South 
Africa.  
The period that was dawning, and particularly from the 1980s onwards, would see the 
territory divided into an area of Mpla control, where a one-party-state system was 
developed, and an area of Unita control also characterised by an autocratic, militarist 
structure of power relying considerably on traditional power structures for the 
management of populations within their territories. According to Rothchild and Hartzell 
(1995), the end to direct external involvement would only occur, among other changes, 
after a military stalemate around 1987 and 1988 made it clear for South Africa that the 
balance of forces had changed and the cost of war now exceeded its anticipated benefits. 
The subsequent New York Accords, signed on December 22 1988, marked the end of 
the internationalized Cold-War status of the conflict with the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from Angola and the independence of Namibia
5
. Nevertheless, the New York 
Accords contained no provisions for addressing the internal conflict in Angola or 
additional commitments by external actors to end their assistance to the parties (Hartzell 
& Hoddie, 2007).  
The accords were the culmination of the lengthy Chester Crocker (United States 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) negotiations process initiated seven 
years earlier and which, with the initial policy paper approved by Ronald Reagan in 
March 1981, also included political reconciliation between Unita and the Mpla as an 
objective. The fact that such an objective was dropped from the negotiations is 
supposedly due to Mpla fears over Unita, reported by the Soviets when questioned by 
the US (Crocker, 1993). At this stage, the parties to the conflict were simply too far 
apart for any solution, or in other words, the parties lacked the ripeness for resolution 
(Hampson, 1996). Furthermore, the internal Angolan conflict was subordinate to the 
overall regional solution and did not jeopardise achieving the latter.  
The New York Accords closed the first Cold-War sub-period of the Angola conflict, 
which started in 1975 and inaugurated the second sub-period characterised by a non-
                                                 
4 As a reference to the relative dimensions of each movement’s ethnic constituents, one can highlight 
the Bakongo with 12 per cent, Mbundu with 24 percent and Ovimbundu with 32 per cent, more or less 
associated with the Fnla, Mpla and Unita respectively. But these should not be considered as directly 
reflecting the movements or the parties or their respective organizational capacities at the time or in future 
periods. 
5 Additionally, it would implicitly mean the end to South Africa's incursions into Angolan territory and 
an informal agreement is believed to have included the closing of African National Congress (ANC) 
training camps in Angola (Rothchild & Hartzell, 1995). 
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internationalized status of the Angola conflict, which would terminate with the end of 
the Cold War and the Bicesse peace process in 1991.  
Therefore, although the conflict in Angola continued, negotiations between the Mpla 
and Unita beginning in early 1989 would lead to the Gbadolite Accord of June. The 
accords did not achieve peace, nevertheless the process surrounding it was important 
because it identified national reconciliation in Angola as an objective, recognized 
Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko as mediator and created some regional peer 
pressure to reach an agreement. Moreover, it gave Unita and its leader increased 
respectability and legitimacy (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995). 
Only after the war had reached a military stalemate did both parties come to a peace 
agreement. In May 1991, the Bicesse Accords were signed in the context of the Cold-
War ending
6
. The Bicesse Accords stipulated an immediate ceasefire, the creation of a 
national army and elections (James, 2004) in accordance with a semi-presidential 
democratic model. It is reported that the rapport between the parties at this stage went as 
far as being involved in joint operations against the Front for the Liberation of the 
Enclave for Cabinda (FLEC)
7
 in the oil rich enclave of Cabinda (MRP, 2005).   
The accords had significant military power-sharing provisions including the 
establishment of a national military force in parity and some political power-sharing 
provisions through verification commissions. Its significant shortcoming was that 
executive power was modelled on a presidential “loser-takes-nothing” (Gates & Storm, 
2007) structure. This was most evident in the absence of an agreement on a framework 
for decentralization, covering the structure for regional and local government, which 
was only to be decided after the elections (Rothchild & Hartzell, 1995).  
Implementation of the agreement faltered as although the ceasefire held, troop assembly 
and demobilization lagged behind, especially for Unita troops, amongst warning signs 
that Jonas Savimbi might be contemplating the scenario of returning to conflict 
(Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). Its implementation was supported by UNAVEM II (United 
Nations Angola Verification Mission), a mission considered to be insufficient in size 
and capacity for the challenge (Hodges, 2001).  
Despite these signs, national elections were held on September 29 and 30, 1992. Unita 
lost the legislative (34 percent against 54 percent for the Mpla) and presidential 
elections, with José Eduardo dos Santos achieving 49.7 percent of the votes and Jonas 
Savimbi 40 percent even if a second round of balloting, never carried out, for the 
presidential election would be required as neither of the two main presidential 
candidates had achieved a clear majority. Despite being considered “generally free and 
fair” by the international community, Unita claimed electoral fraud and resumed 
conflict.  
Unita is normally considered an inside spoiler (because it was a willing participant in 
the process) of the peace process of 1991/1992 in Angola. Stedman (1997) argues that 
an important factor in the decision to reengage in conflict was a conviction by Jonas 
Savimbi and his generals that a military victory was possible at that time. And, in fact, 
in just a short period, Unita was able to take about 70% of the territory. Nonetheless 
when a year later, in November 1993, Jonas Savimbi returned to negotiations it was 
                                                 
6 Bicesse is a small village in the council of Cascais in Portugal, where the accords were signed.   
7 Since the 1960s, FLEC has been fighting a low intensity guerrilla campaign for the independence of 
the oil rich Angolan enclave and would not be involved in any of the agreements. In August 2006, a 
ceasefire was signed between FLEC-Renewed and the Angolan Government. 
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“after the rearmed Angolan army had rolled back Unita's gains, the United States had 
granted diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government, the United Nations had 
imposed sanctions, and 300,000 Angolans had been killed” (Stedman, 1997, 39). 
A negotiated process aiming at an expanded power-sharing agreement began in 1993 
leading to the relatively successful Lusaka Protocol of 1994. This protocol augmented 
the power-sharing provisions of the Bicesse Accord to include not only executive power 
sharing (allegedly including a non-written agreement on a vice-presidential position for 
Jonas Savimbi) but also extended to the police force and the territorial level with the 
provision of governorships and municipalities.   
In the following years of 1996 and 1997, peace was almost reached with the support of 
the international community through UNAVEM III but Unita’s implementation of the 
protocol faltered. For instance, the formation of the Government of Unity and National 
Reconciliation (GURN) only occurred in April 1997, when some Unita disenfranchised 
deputies took up their seats in parliament (Hodges, 2001). In September 1998, the 
government suspended the coalition accusing Jonas Savimbi of continually reneging on 
his commitments and specifically of holding onto his strongholds (especially Andulo 
and Bailundo) while secretly rearming his army (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Vidal, 2006) 
and shortly after declared the peace process annulled and that the only path to peace was 
war.  
The conflict would only finish with the victory of the Mpla over Unita in 2002, after 
Jonas Savimbi’s death and the signing of the April 2002 Luena Memorandum of 
Understanding, which represented an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol. In particular, it 
includes provisions for the integration of Unita officers and soldiers into the national 
army and the rest to be demobilized. The success of this agreement confirms the study 
of Licklider (1995), which identifies how among civil wars that have ended, the 
settlements imposed by a conflict’s victor prove more durable than negotiated 
agreements (in Hatzell & Hoddie, 2003). Nevertheless the negotiation process at this 
stage together with the power-sharing provisions of the Lusaka protocol were also 
important in guaranteeing peace within Unita.  
 
The nature of the parties 
Key actors in the time-line process described above are the Mpla and Unita parties, 
wherein their characteristics definitely shaped the events and choices made. For this 
reason, it is important to look at the history of both the Mpla and Unita (the Fnla is not 
analysed here as it did not constitute a significant military force as from the early 1980s) 
and identify their main characteristics.  
Mpla  
The Mpla was formed in the 1950s in the coastal and urban areas of the centre north, 
gaining support mainly from the Mbundus of Luanda and Malanje and from mixed-race 
intellectuals. The role of each ethnic group and of socialism in the party has been 
contested ever since, but the driving force of this group at the time was opposition to the 
Portuguese colonial government (Spikes, 1993). 
Around independence, the party fragmented into three groups, one led by President 
Agostinho Neto and two contenders, who would lose the contest: Daniel Chipenda and 
the Andrade brothers. Soon after independence a new challenge to Agostinho Neto 
would come from within his party with an attempted coup by Nito Alves in 1977. 
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Again, Agostinho Neto emerged victorious but this time executed a process of 
rectification, which extended well beyond the party, Luanda and that year (Hodges, 
2001).  
In the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état, the Mpla would increase presidential 
powers, create a frightening state security system, purge the party from 110,000 
members to 31,000 with the establishment of rigorous selection processes and military 
political control of the judiciary system (Vidal, 2006). Integrated in this process was the 
transformation of the Mpla into a Workers Party in December 1977, establishing the 
vision of a one-party-state inspired on the Marxist-Leninist model.   
According to Hodges (2001), these initiatives created conditions for an uncontested 
succession of Agostinho Neto by José Eduardo dos Santos as president in 1979 (when 
the former died of illness during treatment in Moscow), but essentially the rectification 
process gave birth to a generalized culture of fear, conformism, lack of initiative and 
submission in society.  
The characteristics of authoritarianism, rectification, inter-penetration of the state and 
party structures and the political control of the judicial system continued after 1979. 
Most of all, a process was initiated concentrating powers away from the party and into 
the presidency, which would be justified by the war besetting the country. In the early 
1980s, the Office of the President was created to deal with foreign business, most 
importantly to control oil revenues (Vidal, 2006). In December 1982, the Central 
Committee afforded special powers to the president empowering him to reshuffle both 
the Politburo and the Mpla Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) 
(George, 2005) and in 1983 and 1984 creating a kind of parallel martial government 
responding directly to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, which was the 
President in office (Vidal, 2006).  
Although progressively concentrating power in himself, the president needed to 
carefully negotiate policy changes within his group. In 1984, Crocker (1993) could still 
grasp some vulnerability in the position of dos Santos in the stances taken by the Mpla 
in negotiations. Additionally, in the early 1990s, during the Bicesse accord negotiations, 
the Mpla had to carry out a military and cabinet reshuffle, most likely to remove 
potential critics of conciliation efforts with Unita (Hatzell & Hoddie, 2007) from 
positions of influence. Or later, in early September 1991, on the eve of elections when 
“Santos privately expressed interest [in a power-sharing agreement with Unita] but felt 
he could not publicly commit to such a deal” (Stedman, 1997, 38). 
Throughout the 1980s, a new, select group of young politicians and technicians were 
promoted through the ranks of the system and owing their ascension to power 
significantly to the president (as occurred also in the FAPLA and the party) (Vidal, 
2006). The decade and a half of inconsistent economic plans, where reform would be 
followed by counter reform (Hodges, 2001) and also the incapacity in the 1990s to 
reach agreement with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) can well 
be explained by the resistance that the established system made to significant changes to 
neo-patrimonialism
8
 and the president's needs to accommodate the demands of his 
power base.  
                                                 
8 There are several definitions of neo-patrimonialism. In this case, it intends to refer to a situation of 
patrons using state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, and is 
indicative of informal patron-client relationships that can reach from very high up in state structures, 
down to individuals in say, small villages.  
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Correspondingly, the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s saw significant changes 
with the formal elimination of the one-party-state system, introduction of a multiparty 
system, some basic democracy type laws and economic reforms to partially open up the 
system. The party itself was also revitalized in the run up to the 1992 elections with a 
reorganization of its structure, expansion in the distribution of material rewards, 
political recovery of traditional authorities and an increase in membership from 65,362 
in 1990 to 544,639 at the end of 1992 (Vidal, 2006).   
But the regime did essentially keep its power concentrated in the president (for instance, 
there was no decentralization) and supported by two core pillars: the Mpla party, an 
extraordinary instrument in the service of the president, and the army, militarily 
efficient and politically loyal (Chabal, 2006).  
The results of the elections afforded José Eduardo dos Santos and Angola international 
prestige, which gained a significant landmark in 1993 with US recognition of the Mpla 
government. Simultaneously, this lowered the risk of a presidential challenge from 
within the Mpla (Hatzell & Hoddie, 2007) thereby certainly allowing more flexibility in 
the negotiation period leading up to the Lusaka protocol and the envisioned GURN 
coalition government. 
In the second half of the 1990s, there is an intensification of the co-optation strategy of 
the Mpla. It not only spread extensively to any form of civil society initiative but also to 
the opposition parties, a phenomenon categorized as “Renewed”. The most symbolic is 
that of Unita where there was a split in the leadership and the “Renewed Unita” 
emerged and assumed seats in parliament reserved for Savimbi’s party, although 
without credibility.   
In summary, ever since its inception, the Mpla is a party with significant incidence of 
eliminating contestants rather negotiation and dilution. A system of neo-patrimonialism 
began to be implemented as early as the creation of a one-party-state-system under the 
Cold War umbrella. But the gravitational power quickly shifted from the party to the 
president. The extent this system of clientelism would reach into society depended on 
the overall economic situation provided by the oil revenues. Although forced to 
formally change due to the war and economic collapse and to go through elections, the 
main historic operating structures of the regime (for instance, the party-state 
relationship, army or executive workings) were never dismantled (Messiant, 2006), 
because the elections were won and then change was either not implemented or limited 
in scope. This organism, with deep roots going back before independence, carefully 
selected the new generation of leaders, co-opting and buying in opponents, has been led 
by the same president for over two decades. There is little predisposition to seriously 
release power to the other party in the conflict or open up the oil revenues to new 
potential rivals. This is particularly, so after 1992-1993 when the regime was granted 
international recognition and Unita started to be seen unanimously by the international 
community as the spoiler of peace in Angola.  
Unita  
Unita was founded in the 1960s by Jonas Savimbi in the south of Angola mainly 
supported by the Ovimbundu people of the central plateau. During the struggle for 
independence, Unita allegedly collaborated with the Portuguese through the provision 
of information. Its organization was initially based on the structure of the protestant 
church and traditional popular leaders.    
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In the aftermath of the Mpla independence military victory, Unita was weakened, 
particularly so because it had not achieved its strategic objective of securing the 
Benguela railway, which might have gained it recognition from Zambian President, 
Kenneth Kaunda, and had temporarily lost significant support from South Africa. In 
early 1976, Unita resorted to guerrilla warfare, regrouping in the jungle before later in 
the decade establishing its operational headquarters in Jamba, in Moxico region. 
During the 1980s, Jonas Savimbi managed to develop Unita into a “quasi-state” 
dimension able to exercise the monopoly of force in its areas. A diamond economy 
developed and established centralized territorial control with a governance structure 
including a president, government and service institutions. The authority system was 
institutionalised according to a patrimonial functional logic, according to which 
economic resources and power positions were distributed along patron-client relations. 
The system was stabilised through the brutal use of force, applied especially for the 
purpose of eliminating challengers to the authority of Jonas Savimbi (Bakonyi & 
Stuvoy, 2005). 
In the late 1980s, Unita is believed to rule a region in Jamba with between 8,000 to 
10,000 people, 80,000 to 100,000 in the surrounding regions and with about 30,000 
troops in 1984 (George, 2005). 
The 1990s are shaped by an attempt by Unita to transform itself from a guerrilla force 
into a political party with parliamentary and governmental responsibilities. These 
changes lead to significant instability inside the party. The first sign of it was a high-
profile defection in the run-up to the elections with accusations over an assassination 
plot against Jonas Savimbi (Stuvoy, 2002).  
The incapacity to transform into a political party and the electoral defeat saw a series of 
factions challenging the Jonas Savimbi leadership. The first significant break away 
faction came from the Renewed-Unita which took up seats in both the parliament and 
GURN in 1997. In the following year, 1998, a new Unita Chivukuyuku faction would 
emerge, but failed to recruit influential supporters. By 2001, five factions could be 
identified although the militaristic Jonas Savimbi wing continued to be the dominant 
(Stuvoy, 2002).  
The monolithic structure could not adapt and the disintegration of authority from the 
mid-1990s led to a situation in 1998 where Unita administrative structures had nearly 
dissolved (Bakonyi & Stuvoy,  2005) and with it also the patrimonial system. 
Furthermore, the aggressive military stance of the Mpla after 1998 led to recurrent 
military losses for Unita.   
Only with the death in combat of Unita leader, Jonas Savimbi, could peace be reached. 
His leadership was able to create the rebel group and party to the extent of long being an 
effective threat to the Mpla government and having also acquired international status in 
the 1980s
9
.  
Once again, the Cold War setting bred a rebel group, without concern as to whether its 
organizational structures would be conducive to a form of shared-power, but rather 
concerned about its capacities to progressively challenge the Soviet like state. The 
                                                 
9 Jonas Savimbi first travels to the US in 1981 and in that year returns to be met by Reagan 
administration officials. In 1986, Jonas Savimbi is officially received in Washington by President Ronald 
Reagan and meets with the Secretaries of Defence and State. In 1988, Jonas Savimbi returns to the US 
and meets the presidential candidate (and vice-president) George Bush. In 1991, he would return to the 
US and meet President George Bush. 
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autocratic monolithic system of the organization was maintained throughout and 
incapable of adapting to a post-election culture and began to break up under military, 
political and economic pressure.  
Additionally, the Unita party showed no signs of being able to incorporate internal 
dissident voices in 1992 and therefore it does not seem likely that there would be many 
chances to integrate into a structure with opposing voices. For instance, from the late 
1990s onwards, it was probably more profitable for the Unita leadership to gain 
entrance into the Mpla neo-patrimonial system and negotiate access to its own revenue 
sources than to continue fighting. Some of the high-ranking Unita leaders did this by 
establishing some break away factions. Nevertheless, the militaristic faction of Jonas 
Savimbi did not. Eventually, this Unita faction, which continued to defy the elections, 
may be considered a case of illegitimate representation of their constituent interests - by 
this time the value of peace had increased significantly.  
 
Limitations of the power-sharing model in Angola  
Several factors can be found in the literature for the failure to reach or implement the 
power-sharing agreements identified above in the Angolan conflict’s history. They can 
be grouped into: inappropriate external pressure, a lack of a structural power-sharing 
solution, leadership characteristics and ambitions, mistrust after a prolonged war and the 
role of resources in shaping incentives for the parties. 
External pressure
10
 influenced the conflict in several ways. Indirectly but 
fundamentally, the political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union system required 
the Mpla regime to readjust. Superficially when regional actors (Mobutu Sese Seko) 
pressured the Mpla and Unita into signing the Gbadolite accords in 1989, which did not 
reflect the real intentions of the parties (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007) but did engage them 
in a negotiated process. By the incapacity to halt the conflict given the international 
community: lacked consensus after Unita’s 1992 return to war and therefore did not 
send clear signals to local parties as to how unacceptable some solutions to a country's 
challenges are (Spears, 2000); and lacked effective implementation capacity to perform 
its assigned role, where due to the “inability of third parties, notably the United Nations, 
to provide resources needed to implement the 1991 peace accords doomed them to 
failure in the face of widespread cheating and non-compliance” (Hampson, 1996, 88).  
In addition, a broader and swifter array of power-sharing and power-dividing 
institutions have been identified as important in order to increase the likelihood for a 
negotiated peace (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). For instance, Stedman (1997) identifies the 
lack of power-sharing provisions in the 1991 Bicesse accords as a reason for the 
resumption of the conflict, although this author extensively identifies moments before 
and after the elections where power-sharing proposals were unsuccessfully presented 
both to the Mpla and Unita by a range of external actors, in particular the United States 
and South Africa.   
However this factor links to the next, regarding leadership, in the argument of Jarstad 
(2006). It is claimed that the 1994 Lusaka power-sharing provisions were good because 
                                                 
10 One cautionary note is in place here. Just as Chester Crocker (1993) highlights that regional powers 
(like the parties in control in South Africa or Cuba) do not hang around awaiting superpower instructions 
to execute their policies, in the same manner non regional powers like the parties in Angola have a will of 
their own and act as much out of the external constraints and pressures presented to them as from inner 
needs, organic requirements and local constrains and pressures. 
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they were able to attract some Unita factions, isolating the militarist Jonas Savimbi 
group, eventually leading to this group's defeat and its leader’s death in combat. When 
that occurred, the implementation of the agreement could resume without additional 
militaristic factions emerging rendering Lusaka, and its provisions, a positive 
contribution to peace. Nevertheless, this argument is based on the assumption that 
Savimbi's group would not settle for peace in any case. Even if the inducement only 
opened the Unita appetite for power in 1992, as Stedman (2007) argues, Jonas 
Savimbi’s behaviour can be considered that of a “greedy spoiler” where a heavy dose of 
coercion combined with extremely high costs for non-compliance, might have been a 
better option for achieving peace. According to Stedman (1997) Ambassador-designate 
Edmund De Jarnette identified Savimbi’s personality and his hegemonic ambitions for 
Angola as the problem. Furthermore, other leadership incompatibilities included the 
personalities of the leaders being a source of limitations at the time of elections (Anstee, 
1996, 147) and their track record of leading their parties against each other in the midst 
of fervent denunciations (Spears, 2000). 
Mistrust and the results of decades of war led to a relationship of in-depth antagonism 
between the groups. Messiant (2006) identifies the issue of mistrust between the parties 
as limiting the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka accord. In this case, Unita would not 
demilitarize until it gained power and the Mpla was determined to limit the 
effectiveness of the GURN.  One always needs to factor in that after almost two decades 
of conflict supporters from both Unita and the Mpla, as well as the general population, 
had known no other modus operandis than conflict (with brief periods of relative peace 
and differing intensities depending on location) with each other. What is more, concerns 
over the fragile peace process, leading to six successive amnesties between 1981 up to 
the late 1990s, which allowed the development of an environment of impunity in 
society conducive to human rights violations, further exacerbated the lack of trust 
between the groups (Hodges, 2001).  
Finally, the key role of resources in shaping the incentives of the parties is almost 
unanimously identified in the literature as a factor contributing to the prolonged 
continuation of the conflict
11
. Although this factor cannot totally explain the conflict it 
had a singular role in funding it, while during the Cold War, support was also derived 
from the respective external supporters. The existence of sources of funding generated 
the lack of pressure to concede more and reach shared solutions.   
 
An additional cause for failure – the monolithic nature of the parties 
Nevertheless, these factors do not completely address the underlying question of the 
lack of pre-disposition to enter into power-sharing solutions, conducive both to peace 
and eventually to democracy. One additional factor is required to better explain the 
shortcomings to the overall peace process. This underlying factor is the nature of the 
two parties in the conflict. Their similarities in terms of their monolithic structures and 
cultures allowed little organic flexibility to merge or share structures with another 
similar party.  
                                                 
11 See for instance the accounts of Billon (2001a and 2001b) on the role of oil and diamonds in the 
conflict and in Angola and Ferreira (2006) for an overview of the economic conditions from 1961 to 
2002. For an account of external interventions see Wright (2001) for the United States and George (2005) 
for Cuban involvement. 
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This is present throughout the conflict. In the 1989 negotiations, the achievement was 
the recognition by the Mpla of Unita as a party with which to negotiate, even though 
still pushing to maintain the one-party-state system. In the 1992 elections, there were 
two mono-party systems facing each other (Mabeko-Tali’s, 2006): one the party-state of 
the Mpla and the other a rebel movement dominated by its military structure. The 1994 
extended power-sharing solutions proved insufficient to convince the Unita leadership 
to integrate into the state system.  
Looking at one of the most determinant events of the conflict's history in more detail, to 
a certain extent the “winner-takes-all” solution of the 1992 elections was in synchrony 
with the internal logics of both the Mpla and Unita monoliths. There was little prospect 
of success, even if properly enforced, due to their own philosophies – each movement’s 
expected non acceptance of integration into the other. Even later when the GURN was 
established and Unita parliamentary seats occupied, on the one hand Unita members of 
the government would not be allowed to make independent decisions and on the other 
hand the Mpla majority in parliament would block any possibility of alternative action. 
In this short lived period of power-sharing, naturally, the culture was not about reaching 
consensus but most importantly the vision of what the future should be was also not 
considered.  
As suggested by Messiant (2006), the nature of the constitutional changes of 1991 and 
1992, which seem significant, were more of form than of substance as the neo-
patrimonialist patron-client type system was kept intact while functioning within a 
slightly different architecture.  Following on from this perspective, the fact that the 
solution envisioned at Bicesse in May 1991 did not foresee enough provisions for 
power-sharing is then a result of the incapacity to move the Mpla into a more flexible 
and accommodating position, which would in fact change their power structure. As 
would later be confirmed, the opening up of the political system was only to the extent 
that it did not jeopardise control by the incumbent and allowing for the restraining of the 
system should the situation so require and as indeed would happen when conflict 
intensified in 1992 and 1998. It is the sheer incapacity of the Mpla to accommodate 
such demands that is at stake in the context of a belligerent challenger, which was, 
according to most analysts, determined to achieve full power or make its price for peace 
very high. 
One conclusion is that the change process that was initiated in the middle of the 1980s 
should have included provisions not only for constitutional or economic reforms but 
also reform envisioning democratic practices within both parties
12
. It is considered that 
the monolithic nature of the Mpla produced only slight, limited and, sometimes, only 
superficial changes to the party-state apparatus and that Unita disintegrated when faced 
with the need to integrate into this system as the defeated party in the elections.   
 
Conclusion 
In Angola, 27 years on from independence, 14 years after the New York Accords, more 
than 500,000 deaths, tens of thousands of persons mutilated by anti-personnel mines 
and the displacement of approximately 4.1 million people took place before peace was 
secured.  
                                                 
12 The economic reforms attempted could also have progressively allowed for the emergence of new 
groups in the political spectrum but such is not directly analysed here.  
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From a historical perspective, one can identify that in the case of Angola reality linked 
both parties to power. Unita was linked to the central plateau and the Ovimbundu 
possibly as much as the Mpla was linked to Luanda. The Mpla’s openness seems 
directly linked to feelings of insecurity towards Unita and Jonas Savimbi in particular. 
The link of one neo-patrimonialist system and its leadership to the other was eventually 
the “blessing” for peace and the “curse” for democracy, associated with each party’s 
link to oil and diamonds.  
In searching for a solution to the conflict, power-sharing provisions were increasingly 
considered. Starting from the 1989 absence of any provisions to the 1991 significant 
military and lighter political power-sharing provisions, in 1994 power-sharing 
provisions were extended to the executive level. Several factors referenced in the 
literature and identified in this paper either prevent a power-sharing deal being reached 
sooner or inhibit its success.  
This paper adds an additional significant factor limiting the success of power-sharing 
provisions: the monolithic nature of the parties. This is demonstrated by both analysis of 
the conflict’s history and the nature of both organizations – Mpla and Unita.  
In the end, one of the parties would need to be integrated into the other in order to 
survive. In effect, it was the neo-patrimonialist nature of the parties which allowed the 
Mpla to appropriate the Unita factions into their client networks and, finally reach peace 
through victory in 2002 over the sole remaining and already isolated Jonas Savimbi led 
militaristic faction. Nevertheless, this also required negotiation and the implementation 
of the 1994 power-sharing solutions for peace actually to be reached. 
It is hereby proposed that among the several post-conflict social engineering initiatives, 
one that could have positively contributed towards results would have been reform of 
the party structures to move them away from autocratic-monolithic characteristics. 
The analysis presents the parties in an almost unidimensional perspective, without 
exploring the several axes connecting and separating them. Future research could 
incorporate the dimensions of ethnicity, occupation, class, religion, culture, language, 
region, urban/rural and others into the analysis and see to what extent they contributed 
to process outcomes.  
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